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Micro cultural dynamics are concerned with the mechanisms of transmission, retention, and 
modification of cultural information in social networks. When interacting individuals mutually 
recognize that they share psychological reactions to given cultural information, it may be grounded 
as an aspect of their shared reality under specifiable conditions. The interpretation of cultural 
information as socially verified shared reality provides a basis for further dissemination of the 
information and coordinated social action. We review the recent literature that supports this general 
contention, while highlighting the role of emotion – a somewhat under-recognized aspect of shared 
reality research – and emphasizing the mediating role of cultural dynamics in the mutual 
constitution of social reality and shared reality. 
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Introduction 
Culture is a set of available information that is transmitted non-genetically in a human 
population. The social transmission of cultural information between individuals in situ is central to 
cultural dynamics – the formation, maintenance, and transformation of culture over time. 
Interpersonal communication, as a type of cultural transmission, is critical for the establishment of 
shared reality. In this paper, we will spell out the ways in which shared reality is implicated in 
cultural transmission and therefore in cultural dynamics.  
Cultural transmission is composed of four subprocesses: production, grounding, 
interpretation, and memory. Individuals produce a communicable representation of cultural 
information, ground it to the common ground (i.e., add it to the information actually, and perceived 
to be, shared with their interaction partners), interpret the grounded information (i.e., transform it 
into a mental representation), and commit it to memory for future use [1]. Of these, grounding 
establishes mutuality. It occurs when the sender and receiver both recognize that their 
understanding of the communicated information is sufficiently similar to carry out their joint activity 
in the context [2, 3].  
We argue that shared reality affects cultural transmission by changing the way in which 
grounded information is interpreted. Specifically, in the presence of shared reality, this information 
is tagged as socially verified “fact” (Figure 1). Importantly, socially verified information is more likely 
to spread through social networks (Figure 2). In this way, shared reality links cultural transmission to 
macro-level cultural diffusion. In this article, we will first review relevant literature to flesh out these 
propositions and supportive evidence, and then examine the role of emotion in this process. 
 
Grounding and shared reality in dyadic context 
When cultural information is grounded in a dyadic context, the sender and receiver accept 
the grounded information for the purpose of their interaction in the current context. At this point, 
the information is not necessarily taken to be a verified “fact” that is generally applicable to 
everyone under all circumstances. However, if the sender and receiver achieve a shared 
psychological response to the information and mutually recognize this as fulfilling either epistemic 
motives (i.e., to find out what is true) or relational ones (i.e., to form or maintain meaningful 
relationships), then the grounded information becomes a shared reality [4; also see Echterhoff & 
Higgins, this issue]. It is then interpreted as a “fact” that can be generalized beyond the immediate 
context (Figure 1). Thus, shared reality processes tag the cultural information as a socially verified 
fact.  
In a dyadic context, the sender’s motive to achieve mutuality with the receiver can result in 
communicating biased information [i.e., audience tuning; 5, 6]; the sender’s interpretation that the 
communicated information has been socially verified with the receiver, and thus established shared 
reality biases the sender’s memory about the communicated social object [7].  
In addition, the sender’s audience tuned message can bias its receiver’s cognitions as well. 
Stukas, Bratanova, and their colleagues [8] have shown that, if a sender communicates biased 
information about a target group, this can influence the receiver’s attitudes and behavioral 
intentions towards the target when the receiver reported that a sense of shared reality was 
established. This research highlights the role of shared reality as a necessary condition to produce 
the actual sharing of psychological responses and to create biased collective cognitions, which 
neither the sender nor the receiver held before [9].  
Furthermore, grounding and establishing shared reality about a social category (i.e., a group 
of people) can essentialize the social category. Essentialism is a belief that a category has an 
underlying immutable essence, which causes its exemplars to possess their surface-level 
characteristics [10, 11]. Within the context of a social category, it amounts to beliefs that members 
of the social category typically have the same underlying essence (e.g., hostile), which causes them 
to behave in certain ways (e.g., hitting and injuring people). Kashima and colleagues [12] found that 
grounding the information about a novel group can strengthen the communicators’ beliefs that this 
group’s members share the same immutable characteristics. Wagner, Holtz, and Kashima [13] 
suggested that this may be due to the communicators’ use of “essence-tools”, linguistic expressions 
that convey the existence of an immutable essence, including nominalized category labels [i.e., noun 
phrases like “carrot eaters” rather than “people who eat lots of carrots”; 14] and generics [i.e., 
expressions like “Zarpies are scared of ladybugs” which describe general characteristics of a 
category; 15]. 
 
Cultural transmission beyond dyad 
Once cultural information is grounded and interpreted as the dyad’s shared reality, the 
cultural information is regarded as a fact that applies to everyone under all circumstances. One of 
the consequences is that the cultural information can then be further disseminated, diffusing 
through social networks in the broader community and population (Figure 2). Different experimental 
paradigms can simulate the diffusion of cultural information through social networks with different 
structural properties.  
When stimuli are communicated repeatedly by a sender to multiple receivers who belong to 
the same group (repeated reproduction, Figure 3), this simulates a “hub” (highly central node) in a 
social network. If the sender audience-tunes to the first receiver’s attitude and sends a biased 
message, similarly biased messages tend to be repeated in subsequent communications to other 
receivers, provided that a group level shared reality is perceived to exist [16]. Interestingly, these 
repeated communications were biased even though the sender’s memories about the topic of 
communication were in fact more accurate and less biased than their message. Communicating a 
biased message even when more accurate recollections were available to the sender suggests that 
perceived group-level shared reality facilitates the diffusion of potentially biased cultural 
information.  
When stimuli are communicated from one person to another in a chain (serial reproduction, 
Figure 2), this simulates a linear communication chain. Recent research has found that initially 
unstructured information becomes more structured, more meaningful for the communicators, and 
easier to comprehend and communicate [17] as it is transmitted through the chain. This general 
mechanism can create social categories and associate them with a set of attributes, giving rise to 
group boundaries and outgroup stereotypes [18]; it can also amplify negative social evaluations and 
inferences in the context of conflict, resulting in strongly polarized views and prejudice even in the 
absence of justifiable evidence [19]. For a recent review of human and animal research on serial 
reproduction, see [20]. 
There are two mechanisms that potentially enhance the fidelity of cultural transmission by 
enhancing the sense of shared reality about the information. The first is allowing the sender and 
receiver to communicate bidirectionally. Tan and Fay [21] compared the standard serial 
reproduction chain to a chain with a bidirectional interaction and found that senders re-produced 
more information more accurately when given the chance to engage in grounding (e.g., seeking and 
giving clarifications and elaborations). Interestingly, receivers also exhibited superior recall in this 
treatment, suggesting that mutuality is better achieved when opportunities for active grounding in 
communication are afforded. The second mechanism involves the receipt of cultural information 
from multiple senders. When this occurs, receivers tend to exhibit superior memory for the 
information [22]. While this can be partly attributed to the richer input, it also speaks to the 
importance of social validation – integral to shared reality – whereby information that is 
corroborated by multiple sources may be considered more valid and therefore worthy of retention 
in memory.  
 
Collective Common Ground, Collective Shared Reality, and Cultural Dynamics 
 If cultural information spreads beyond dyads (mass media and other communication 
channels can play a significant role here) and its members have a mutual sense of shared reality 
about it within the population (collective shared reality), this information enters into the collective 
common ground (i.e., information that people in a population take for granted as shared within the 
population). Information that is congruent with the common ground tends to be preferentially 
selected for further communication even if equally good or even better quality alternatives are 
available [17, 23-27]. For instance, Fast and colleagues [23] demonstrated that when senders were 
tasked to initiate a conversation about baseball, they showed a strong preference towards choosing 
well-known but underperforming players as a topic of their conversation over lesser known players 
whose recent performance was outstanding. Because familiarity facilitates grounding and the 
achievement of mutuality [17], it can therefore facilitate cultural diffusion.  
 Chiu and colleagues [28] used the term, intersubjective culture, to refer to culture that is 
collectively seen to be shared in a population. Several studies showed that intersubjective culture 
influences values [29, 30] as well as other psychological tendencies like thinking styles, attribution, 
and compliance [31]. Shared reality can also play a role in maintaining the values and beliefs 
perceived to be shared within a collective. Receiving information that denounced beliefs perceived 
to be widely shared within a collective elicited disbelief of the information, and intensified positive 
and affirmative evaluation of the existing cultural beliefs, thus preserving collective shared reality 
[32].  
 
Emotion in Cultural Transmission and Shared Reality 
There is growing evidence that emotion plays a significant role in cultural dynamics. In 
particular, emotional representations — those relating to potential threats or opportunities in the 
environment [33, 34] — are especially likely to characterise the collective common ground. This is 
because when people experience an emotional response to an event, they are highly likely to talk 
about this event, thereby establishing the mutuality of their emotional reaction with others and, 
thus, a shared reality [35-38].   
Whether the event concerns the self or another person, legend or fact, the more it arouses 
emotion, the more willing people seem to disseminate it through social networks [e.g., 39]. There is 
increasing evidence for the preferential dissemination of information within large collectives. For 
instance, the emotionality of the information was found to positively predict the tendency for 
people to share new articles in the New York Times [39], to pass on messages about German state 
elections on twitter [40] and to retweet messages about same-sex marriage and climate change [41].  
Although the increased communicability of emotional information appears to be a robust 
finding, the precise emotions that drive communication in any particular context appears to vary. 
For instance, while some studies have found a communication advantage for negatively valenced 
information like disgust and fear [42, 43], others have failed to find a simple valence effect [35] or 
have found an advantage for positive information [e.g., 39]. Therefore, it is likely that in line with the 
idea of the situated nature of cultural dynamics, relevance of cultural information is likely to vary 
with the specific social context. For instance, although Eriksson, Coultas, and de Barra [44] were able 
to replicate previous findings around the communicability of disgust in North American samples, 
there was no evidence for this effect among Indians who showed a greater preference for 
communicating fear arousing content.  
There is a reason to expect that emotional information, once communicated, is especially 
likely to be incorporated into shared reality. First, people appear to talk about emotional events, at 
least in part, out of a desire to establish a sense of shared reality with their audience. Specifically, 
Duprez et al. [45] found that almost half of their sample reported that they had told another person 
about an emotional event in order to clarify their understanding of, and appropriate response to, the 
event, or to establish a shared perspective of it. Indirect evidence that communicators look to 
establish shared reality comes from work that shows that communicators who do not have their 
emotional response verified by their audience perceive this audience more negatively [e.g., 46]. 
Second, people’s tendencies to express the emotions that they feel (whether verbally or 
nonverbally) makes it likely that any actual congruence in emotional response will be mutually 
recognised as such and contribute to a sense of shared reality. In line with this possibility, Peters et 
al. [47] found that the amount of time dyads spent discussing a positive or negative norm violation 
(a type of event that can arouse emotions) had a positive indirect association with their sense of 
shared reality.    
Emotional events that are incorporated into collective common ground are also likely to 
continue to disseminate through networks of communicators. In this way, emotional experiences, as 
well as representations of the event’s significance and appropriate behavioural responses, can 
become shared within collectives [48]. This shared reality means that the significance of ambiguous 
events is likely to be resolved in ways that amplify perceptions of their significance. In line with this, 
Yzerbyt et al. [49] found that allowing students to discuss a controversial educational policy 
increased their perceptions that the policy was unfair and their levels of anger relative to students 
who were not allowed to discuss it. As well as helping people to coordinate their collective 
responses to threats and opportunities, it will predispose members of the network to categorise 
themselves as members of a group that can achieve their emotion-related goals [48, 50]. 
 
Conclusion 
 Shared reality processes provide a critical link in connecting micro-level cultural transmission 
to macro-level diffusion of cultural information, and therefore formation, maintenance, and 
transformation of the distribution of cultural information in a population. We suggest that shared 
reality acts as a cognitive tag, signifying that the transmitted and grounded cultural information has 
been socially verified as a “fact” and therefore is applicable in the future to others under other 
circumstances. Once established as shared reality, the cultural information can then be transmitted 
further beyond the particular context of cultural transmission to others in the population and thus 
diffuse through social networks. Recent work has pointed to the significance of emotion as a driver 
of cultural dynamics. Although the role of emotion in shared reality processes is not well 
understood, we suggest that it may be critical to investigate it in future research. 
 
  
Outstanding Interest (**) 
Duprez, Christophe [45] 
The authors build on evidence that people share emotional content by explaining why they do so. 
This paper discusses the development and testing of a 7-factor social sharing motives scale. In 
addition to intra-individual motives, like venting, several of these factors broadly relate to a desire to 
establish a shared reality.  
 
Stukas, Bratanova [9] 
An examination of the communication processes involved in the creation of cultural information 
(i.e., social stereotypes) from both sender’s and receiver’s perspectives. The studies highlight the 
role of grounding efforts, in the form of audience tuning, and shared reality in the creation of biased 
cognitions and behavioural tendencies towards a social group that neither communication partner 
held before.  
 
Special Interest (*) 
Fast, Heath [23] 
Research of high ecological validity demonstrating how the pursuit of grounding in communication 
contributes to the maintenance of culturally prominent information.  
 
Hunzaker [27] 
Deflection of information is the extent to which the information is felt to be strange and incongruous 
given the culturally shared affective meaning about the topic of the communication. The paper 
shows how to measure deflection, and provides evidence that people attempt to reduce deflection 
in retelling a cultural narrative, thereby contributing to cultural maintenance. 
 
Martin, Hutchison [18] 
A serial reproduction study that demonstrates the emergence of meaningful stereotypes through 
sheer social transmission processes. 
 
Yzerbyt, Kuppens [49] 
This paper shows how allowing groups to communicate about a negative event (versus an irrelevant 
topic) leads to more extreme emotional reactions and appraisals, and well as higher levels of group-
based identity.  
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 Figure 1: Cultural dynamics and shared reality. Shared reality process tags the grounded 
information as socially verified, and therefore the information is interpreted as a “fact” usable in the 
future in different contexts.  
 
  
Figure 2: Cultural dynamics in social networks. Cultural information may be grounded in a dyad and 
its shared reality is established via mutual recognition of shared psychological responses; it then can 
drive further diffusion of information through social networks beyond the dyad.  
 
 
 
Figure 3: Experimental paradigms for cultural dynamics and social network structure. Different 
experimental paradigms can be used to simulate different social network structures. The method of 
serial reproduction simulates a chain: person 1 receives the stimulus and reproduces it to person 2, 
who then in turn communicates to person 3, etc. The method of repeated reproduction simulates a 
star: person 1 reproduces the stimulus to person 2, person 5, person 6, and so on. 
 
